SOME NEW BOOKS.

The Fourteenth Amendment

We are indebted to Judge HENRY BRANK of the Supreme Court of West Virginia for an elaborate Treatice on the Rights and Privileges Guaranteed by the Fourteenth on of the United Amendment to the Cons States (Cincinnati, W. H. Anderson & Co.) Of course, the Fourteenth Amendment has been, to a certain extent, discussed in works upon general Constitutional law. The book us is, so far as we know, the only work especially devoted to the subject, and to the decisions by which the amendment has seen construed and applied. Even this treatise deals only with the first and fifth sections of the amendment, but these, we cely need to say, embrace a spacious field. As the author points out in a prefac they include the rights, privileges and imties of Federal officenship, naturalisa tion, life, liberty, property and equal protection of the laws; due process of law; the relations and respective powers of the nation and of the States under the Fournation and of the States under the Four-teenth Amendment; the relative functions of Federal and State courts; the ferce and affect of State decisions in Federal courts; the jurisdicting of the Supreme Court of the United States over the Supreme courts of the States for the enforcement of that amendment; the powers of Federal Courts over State courts by the removal of causes and habeas corpus to enforce the amendment; the effect of overruled State cases in Federal courte; the powers of the States as to police texation and emineut domain as by the Fourteenth Amendment, and the right of restraint by the nation over the States therein; the restrictions that may be imposed upon monopolies and trusts and stions; the power to restrain by injunction strikes and boycotts, called "government by injunction:" the subject of exclusive sharters and grants by States and municipalities as fostering monopolies, with which subject is coupled the question how far such harters and grants are inviolable contracts; the rights of naturalization and expatriation, the power of the United States to acquire hold and govern foreign territories, and under what principles such Government must be regulated-whether "the Constitution fol-lows the flag," into such territory when acquired: and many other incidental and cognate subjects. It is, however, to be borne in mind that the decisions here reproduced of the United States Supreme Court and of other Federal and State courts are brought down only to February, 1901, and, consequently, do not cover the recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court in the Porto Rico cases

Let us recall the text of the first and fifth sections of the Fourteenth Amendment the sections with which Judge Brannon's treatise is concerned. The first section runs as follows: "All persons born or naturalized in the United States and subject to the jurisdiction thereof are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty or property without due process of law nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the law;" the fifth section declares that the Congress shall have power to enforce by appropriate legislation the provisions of this article.

Are Filipinos and Porto Ricans citizens in the view of the first section above quoted? Writing before the recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court in the Porto Rican cases Judge Brannon holds that the question must be answered in the negative. It is supposed, he says, that the inhabitants of the Philippine Islands and the island of Porto Rico lately acquired from Spain by treaty are not by virtue of such acquisition citizens of the United States. They were not born within the territory and allegiance of the United States, as required by the Fourteenth Amendment, and cannot be citizens because the common law and law of nations defining natural citizens as those born within the territory and allegiance of a country. The act of 1802 limited naturalization to "white persons," as does also the present law, and it naturalized, and it has been further held in the United States Circuit Court that a Mongolian is not a "white person" and cannot be naturalized. "As these decisions limit naturalization to the Caucasian or white race it is questionable whether a Filipino can be naturalised. Probably not, under those decisions. However, it remains to be decided. Mankind is divided in ethnology into different races. One of these is the Caucasian or white race, another Mongolian, another Malayan A Filipino is understood to be one or other of the two latter races; or rather, some are of one and some of the other. We do not see how he can be naturalized under the statute as it is." Our author here reminds us that the act of 1870 specifically brings the African within the Naturalization act, but beyond that specified exception the words "white persons" still find place in the law and would seem, therefore, to exclude Mongolians and Malayans. On the other hand, Judge Brannon presumes that Spaniards or others of white blood resident in the Philippine Islands would come under our naturalization laws He supposes also that Porto Ricans are entitled to naturalization, as they are of either Caucasian or African extraction. Neither has he any doubt that the children of Filipinos born since the acquisition of the islands by the United States would be citizens. Even with, regard to the Filipinos who were born before the islands were acquired by treaty the opin ion is expressed that, while they do not come within the Naturalization laws, "still they are American freemen entitled as persons (under the Fifth and Sixth Amendments to the Constitution of the United States and under the Civil Rights act and the free spirit of our Government) to the personal rights accorded by the benign system of government of the

United States. They are subject to our jurisdiction and laws, and from that very fact they are freemen in a free republican government, not subjects of an empire or monarchy. The

to no such provision as to the natives of those

islands, who, by the treaty, are made sub-

Is the right of suffrage included among the privileges and immunities pr from State action by the Fourteenth Amend ment? The question is here answered in the negative. The right of suffrage is not conferred by Federal law or the Federal Constitution, but is derived from the State alone. The State may give or withhold it as it chooses, but cannot deny it because of "race, color or previous condition of servitude," as that would violate the Fifteenth Amendment Mere Federal citizenship does not confer the right to vote in any State. Obviously, the nation cannot say who shall vote for State officers, because the na-tional power is limited to express or im-plied grants in the Constitution, and this power to prescribe the qualifications of voters not being given to the nation nor prohibited to the States, is reserved by implication to the States, and is also expressly reserved to them by the letter of the Tenth Amendment. Cannot the nation, however, prescribe the qualifications for voters for Federal office? It certainly cannot as United States Senators or Presidential Electors, because the Constitution leaves the selection of those officers to the State. Can, then, the nation define who shall vote for Representatives in Congress? This question also must be answered in the negative, except so far as the Fifteenth Amendmen tution says that voters for such Representatives "shall possess qualifications requisite for electors of the most numerous branch of the State Legislature," it is clear that for Representatives is left to the State. W cannot say, strictly speaking, that the Fif teenth Amendment prescribes qualification for voters for State elections by granting to colored people the right of suffrage, for it is held in United States vs. Reese that "the Fifteenth Amendment does not confer the right of suffrage, but it invests citizens of the United States with the right of exemption from discrimination on account of race, color or previous condition of servitude, and empowers Congress to enforce that right by appropriate legislation." If the State definition of suffrage happen to deny it to a colored man for any substantial ground other than race, color or previous

condition of servitude, it violates no privilege

or immunity given by the Federal Consti-

In the chapter on interstate com our author discusses the limitations of competition. He recalls the fact that in Addyston Pipe Company vs. United States, the Court holds that to fall under the censure of the act of Congress against combinations, trusts, conspiracies, and so forth, the agreement complained of must "directly and substantially, and not merely indirectly, remotely or incidentally, regulate to a greater or less degree commerce among the States." With reference to the significance of this decision, Judge Brannon warns us not to lose sight of the rule that, "as between individuals, each has a right to compete with the other, to draw away custom, to outstrip him in the race of contestation, and even thereby ruin his fellow man; for that is freedom of business, of contract, of earning a living, the freedom of competition. Every one has a right to enlarge his business, even though by means of greater capital, superior facilities and capacity, he monopolize business and ruin his competitors. If the business be lawful, even though it overshadow others, who can prevent it in a land of Constitutional law, where the Constitutions (State and Federal] declare that there shall be liberty Is there too much liberty in the United States? If so, blame these Constitutions. The mere operation by lawful means of lawful business, however hurtful to others, is not actionable. It may cause damage, but it is damage without violation of another's rights. Whatever one has a right to do another cannot have right to complain of. If one operator designed to injure another in trade, that | An act of Congress declaring that all persons under the law of business than the right of trade competition. Thus, small operators, individual or corporate, have no legal ground of complaint if large operators, by means of large capital, or by union of capital, outstrip and submerge them. The lion may have stretched out his paws and grabbed more prey than other animals, but that is the natural right of the lion in the field of pursuit and capture. Undoubtedly, "from the moment that the arrangements of capitalists wound the public, by depressing trade, by increasing the prices of things needed for the public like commodities and transportation, or by suppressing compeanother cast, and come to be against public policy. The loudest outery, however, against corporations and trusts comes from those who are outstripped in the field of legitimate competition, but no free Government can interfere between competitors in the deyouring race of pursuit and capture which characterizes our day." The cooperation of capital on a great scale is the outcome of social evolution. It is the indispensable in-strument of our great conquests over nature. It is the product of education, science, progress, civilization, invention and machinery. It is true that in the terrible march of modern industries some will perish by the way. What we here witness is but an illustration of the law of the survival of the fittess. Whe or what can prevent such gaps upon the march

not individuals—can the State interwene only when they combine to raise prices and restrain trade as it concerns the entire com munity." We have seen that in Judge Brannon's opinion Filipines and Porto Ricans are not citizens. Are, then, Hawaiians citizens? Yes, because the treaty of annexation makes been in a free republican government, not subjects of an empire or monarchy. The treats of peace with Spain did not give the inhabitance of these islands citizenship but committed the government of them to Congress. Congress must government of them to Congress must government with the supplemental to the precision of the government of them to Congress must government with the government of them to Congress must government with the constitution of the government of them to Congress must government with the Congress must govern them according to the principles of American free government with the constitution of the government of them to Congress must govern them according to the principles of American free government with the constitution of the government of them to the government of them to Congress must govern them according to the principles of American free government with the constitution of the freedom free government with the government of the g them so. Are the American women who have married British subjects citizens or

Judge Brannon, for his part, is confident

that "no free Government can. If it does

so, it arrests the step of others equally en-

titled before the law with the failing ones.

When, and only when, the gladiators in the

industrial arena so work as to effect prej-

udicially the Commonwealth-the public,

for national citizenship, whereas conti residence is necessary to retain State citizenship. Once a Federal citizen, he con tinues such, though no longer resident in the United States but travelling abroad, and is entitled to protection as a citizen until he enounces citizenship by expatriation. man, then, may be a Federal citizen but not State citizen; "this seems unsettled. It is doubtful whether he can be. True, the Four teenth Amendment seems to have for it mission, first, to make native and natural zed citizenship, and, second, to make Fed eral citizens, if resident in a State citizens of that State, and to give them rights as such but it does not seem to go further, and expressly deny the right in States to confer their soparate citizenship. We do not clearly seem to be very anomalous that a man should be a citisen of a State and not of the Union. Again: "It would seem that the Amendment intends to give a full definition of both State and Federal citizenship, and that no one no ing within its definition can be a citizen of either the United States or a State. There fore, as stated above, the permanent res abroad which would amount to expatriation and decitisenise a citizen of the nation would likewise take away his State citizen ship. The doctrine once held that a man might lose his Federal and retain his State citizenship because not complying with the formality for expatriation prescribed by State

statute, would seem no longer to apply."

What, according to our author, is the statu of Filipinos and Porto Ricans? They are, he says, "persons," "free inhabitants," but not citizens. As "persons," they are entitled under the principles of our Government to the rights which belong to persons. "It true that these peoples are subject to the power of Congress as to government. Strictly speaking, we can assign no limit to the power of Congress over the territories, except that found in the Fifth and Sixth Amendments but these bear sway wherever the flag waves over territory within the civil jurisdiction of the United States. These amendment tie the hands of Congress wherever it makes laws for civil government. Justice Brewe so declared in the case of "Fong Yue vs. U. S. To the extent of giving their inhabitant freedom the Constitution stretched over the Philippines and Porto Rico the momen those islands became territories of the nation just as the Thirteenth Amendment abolishe slavery at once in Alaska as it was held in the case "in re Sah Quah." Judge Brannon points out that the proglamations of Presi dent McKinley admitted and proclaimed these principles of free government as the right of the Filipinos and Porto Ricans. His nstructions to the military commander and the Commissioners sent to the Philippines have been based upon those principles. I by no means follows that the Filipinos an Porto Ricans, because they have acquired the rights guaranteed to "persons" under our Constitution, have also acquired citizenship. "When Congress shall admit these islands as States, if ever, their people will become citizens, because the act of ad mission will be a collective act @ naturaliza tion. This averment would have been ad mitted as sound before the Fourteenth Amendment, but may be regarded as a little utestionable since, inasmuch as that amend ment declares who are citizens, limiting them to natives or naturalized persons; "sti

it seems that the amendment makes no difference in the power to make citizens by treaty or the admission of States." Judge Brannon directs attention to the fact that colored persons acquired civil rights by the Fourteenth Amendment and by the Civil Rights act, but did not thereby acquire social rights. Thus, notwithstanding the amendment, marriage between white and col ored persons may be prohibited by a State The regulation of marriage is a powe essential to a State and is not impaired by the Fourteenth Amendment. Even jury trial in a State court is not a privilege of immunity of national citizenship which the amendment prohibits a State from abridging. ould be entitled to equal enjoyment of inns public conveyances, theatres and other places of amusement was pronounced unconstitutional by the United States Supreme Court for the reason that the act was legislation of original character which belonged to the State. The United States Supreme Court has declared that a State statute requiring white and colored persons to ride in separate railroad cars, but providing equaliaccommodation for both, does not violate a privilege or immunity under the Fourteenth Amend ment. The rule, however, has not been applied by the court to care running from State to State engaged in interstate commerce The commerce clause of the Constitution gives the right to carry on interstate trade, and the right of individuals to pass from State to State seems essential to the transac tion of such trade. We observe, also, that State laws providing separate schools for white and colored children have been upheld by the United States Supreme Court.

What is meant by "government by injune tion," as the phrase has been popularly used since the beginning of the Presidential cam paign of 1896? Shis is the term or name o late applied to the exercise by courts of equity of the process of injunction to prevent in terference by bodies of workmen in period of trouble between manufacturing and transportation establishments and corporations on the one hand and their employes and those sympathizing with them on the other hand, with the property or business of such establishments or corporations, by boycotts, strikes and the offering of inducements to laborers to guit the service or not to enter the service of the establishments named. The question is, Does injunction lie in such eases The courts have decided that it does; that combinations of men stopping railroads and impeding transit thereon, or interfering wit other means of transportation, are public nuisances, and subject to restraint by in junction. The courts have also decided that when bodies of men obstruct individuals or manufacturing or industrial establishments involving large property interests of individuals or corporations, they may work irreparable injury to private property and

ment does not require continued residence | tempt and resistance by summary proceed- | war as a means of grace toward a higher

ings without jury (except where a statute otherwise directed), as a matter of neces-sity, else their judgments would be mere The question has been discussed at length by Justice Brewer, who reaffirmed a statement previously made, "If it has ever been understood that proceedings to the common law for contempt have been subject to the right of trial by jury, we have been unable to find any instance of it."

We shall glance finally at what our author

has to say about the effect of the Fourteenth Amendment on divorce. The reader will bear in mind that this book went to press in Feb. ruary, 1901. It is pointed out that a decree for alimony without service of process in side of the State where the action for divorce is brought, even though service should be made outside of the State, is void and not due rocess under the Fourteenth Amendment. In divorce suits and other suits affecting personal status or requiring the execution of deeds, there may, consistently with the amendment, be judgment or decree without personal service on publication, but the law prescribing such constructive notice in place of personal notice must be closely complied with, else the proceeding is void. It is to be kept in view, however, that, although upon publication, there can be a decree of divorce, there can be no decree fof almony That part of the decree would be void. It the law of the State of the actual domicile of the husband or wife allows a divorce on publication or other constructive service o process without personal service, the decree of divorce is effectual the world over, and is due process, though the other party may never have been in the State. This is only the case, however, when the statute as to the publication of notice shall have been complied with. If it be not complied with the decree will make the decree of divorce good if the law of that State allows a divorce there on publication. If neither party has a domicile in the State where the suit is brought, appearance in the suit does not make the decree good. Again, if a husband leave his domicile in one State and go into another only to get a divorce, and thus acts in fraud of the law to obtain unlawful jurisdiction for his suit the wife not being served with process, but absent in the former State, the decree is void. It will not be recognized in another State To give jurisdiction for divorce the party asking it must have actual bone fide domicile in the State of the suit when the suit begins as no State has lawful power over citizens of another State or their status. We repeat that divorces on merely constructive notice are final only as to the personal status by dissolving the marriage; but the decree must not allow alimony or costs, or make provision as to the custody of children or property In so far as it does so, it would be void else where, and probably in the State of the suit tself, because not according to due process. Where, on the other hand, the decree is rendered on personal service of process, it i binding as to alimony, costs and custody of

The Present Status of Christianity. Mesars, Small, Maynard & Co., of Bosto have published agvolume comprising large number of essays, collectively entitled Theology at the Dawn of the Twentieth Century. These papers were prepared by eminen writers in England and the United States in response to the request of the editor, Dr. J. V. MORGAN, who himself contributes the introduction. The purpose of the compilation is to set forth in sharp contrast the two tendencies in theology, liberal and conserva tive, and to indicate the position of great theological questions at the close of the nineteenth century. Among the numerous sub jects here considered we have selected for particular notice those discussed in the following essays: "Christianity at the End of the Nineteenth Century" by Frederic Harrison: "Christianity and its Competitors," by the Rev. Harry Jones, Chaplain-in-Ordinary to the late Queen Victoria; "The Bearing of the Teaching of Jesus Christ on Man's Future exercise of physical omnipotence can crush Prin ipal of Lancashire College, Manchester England: "The Adjustment of the Church of the Future to the Life of the Future, by the Rev. Charles F. Thwing, D. D., LL. D. President of the Western Reserve University and "Progressive Liberalism in the Closing and the Opening Century," by Charles W. Eliot, LL D., President of Harvard University.

It is well known that Mr. Frederic Harrison is the most eminent representative of the Positive philosophy in England. He takes an extremely pessimistic view of the condition of Christianity at the end of the nineteenth century. As to the so-called revival of religion which, it is alleged, has lately taken place, he admits that in ceremonial, in ecclesiastical celebrations, in clerical organization and energy, the progress is manifest. The rites of the Churches, the dignity of worship, the parade of Church societies, are in full activity. Never, indeed, were the Churches more "in evidence" than they are to-day. Their pretensions were never higher; their rolls never fuller; their patrons never more illustrious. But, asks Mr. Harrison, "Is vital religion more general, more effective? Is genuine belief in the creeds more definite and clear? Is Christianity more truly a civilizing, a moralizing force? Who will dare say so? By vital religion I mean not conventional phrases about getting to Heaven. I mean religion that can purify, direct and inspire man's life on earth. By genuine belief in the creeds, I mean literal acceptance of the three creeds in the Book of Common Prayer in their plain sense. When lask if Christianity is a civilizing and moraltzing force, I ask if it holds us back. as a people, from injustice and oppression, and as men and women from the pride of life and the lust of the flesh."

In the major part of his essay the author dwells at length on the evil things patent in our modern life, the chase after money, the rampant love of gambling, the extravagance, the coarseness and the materialistic spirit which seems growing on all sides. In his conclusion, he inquires, "What have the Churches done to purify and check all this? Who would care if they did try? Who would

morality. Why! No medicine man, no witch-finder in Central Africa, hounding on a savage chief to exterminate a neighboring tribe could utter a more atrocious biasphemy. Mr. Harrison's indictment ends as follows: "A church, a creed, which can chant such a requiem as this over the grave of the Nineteenth Century need trouble us no more. It is left henceforth to faith in humanity to do what is can to cure the passions of the strong who are thirsting to crush the weak; to teach what is the true glory of civilized men: to preach the Gospel of Peace which the apostate preachers of Christ have turned into a byword and have made a war cry. These high priests of the New Imperialism have foresworn their own religion, and forgotten their own sacred books. Let them turp back in their Pibles to the story of Ahab and Naboth and refleet that it was the apostate priests who leaped upon the altar and called, from morning even until noon, saying "Oh, Baal, hear us." But it was the task of the true priest to say to the King in his pride, 'Hast thou killed and also taken possession?"

Let us turn to Dr. Caleb Scott's essay on "The Bearing of the Teaching of Jesus Christ on Man's Future Destiny." The position taken in this paper may be thus ummarized: What was the direct teaching of Jesus on the subject of eschatology it extremely difficult, if not impossible, to deide. There can be no doubt, however, that the eschatology of any religion must be inally decided by its central conception of God. Now Josus revealed the nature of God in no ambiguous terms. He taught as plainly as words can teach that God in His unalterable nature is the "Father ' of mankind. This was the centre of His teaching, its masterthought, the pivot on which it all revolved God's fatherhood, not metaphorical, but essential and, so, universal. The doctrine occupies such a place in the teaching of Jesus that we may be perfectly certain that no doctrine incompatible with it is a doctrine of His. What, then, is Dr. Scott's deduction from this premise? "The assumption," he says, "that the destiny of every man, be he never so much handicapped by heredity and environment, is fixed forever by the use he makes of the few short years he spends in the world is utterly untenable. God the Rather, and whatever worlds may succeed this world, however the conditions of existence may vary hereafter. He always will be the Father, and, as such, will always deal with every child of His. This we may regard as an indisputable corollary, God' essential fatherhood being conceded. The doctrine of eternal dampation in the mechanical and unethical form in which it has been commonly held cannot possibly live together with that of the Fatherhood." It is

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amined from three points of view. The 'hurch of the Future, says Dr Thwing, must idjust itself alike to the material conditions, he intellectual conditions and the social conditions of the future. The author concedes that the twentieth will be as the nineteenth century was, a material age. He does not share the regret, however, that absorption in mundane things is so deep. "We should not regret." he says: "we should not lament The Church should find its mightiest triumphs in sec 14 time. For to the Church, as it stands for Christ and for Christianity, a material age turns. A material age is restless; Christianity stands for peace. A material age is full of disappointments: Christianity stands for hope and fulfillment. A material age recognizes

the brevity of its own duration, the lowners of its own ideals, its powerlessness to satisfy the dearest wishes of the human heart. Christianity stands for the infinite and the permanent satisfaction of life." Dr. Thwing, for his part, therefore, would rejoice rather than grieve that the lot of the Church is to be east in a material time. "As from the crude preducts of petroleum are made brilliant dyes, rivalling the colors of the rainbow, as from dark caves is plucked the sunshine of the diamond, so from the hard materialism of our time is to come forth a Christianity more vigorous, more spiritual, more triu uphant. To the fact of materialism the Church must adjust itself, but in doing this she need give up none of her doctrines nor surrender any of her methods which experience has shown to be truly wise. But while she will not write new creeds she may need to supplement the best of her old methods with new methods. The age will demand not what the Church says, but what it can do. In response the Church will develop not the prayer meeting, but the city mission. It will offer not mystieism, but intense practicalism. It will fasten its eyes more on the words, "He went about doing good," than on the words, "He opened His mouth and taught them " The Church adjusting itself to the life of the future will be intensely, mightily practical. Through such an endeavor we shall get a virtually new conception of Christianity and of the Church. Hitherto "the Church has been developed more on its philosophical, doctrina side than on its practical. Our creeds are a good deal better than our practice. We are now to see a development on the side of life The Church coming to a material age and giving it of its life will receive in turn a clearer thought of the Christ, more real, more vital,

sing to the intellectual conditions of

the future whereto the Church will have to adjust itself, Dr. Thwing finds that these

more personal

represent a demand that the Church shall emphasize the reason of and for things. The Church must stand ready to answer the ques-"Why?" The Church must address itself more and more to man's reason. "It no longer bases its claim for the receiving of its beliefs upon its own ipes dirit. It demands that the ground of faith be examined It asks that truth be tested, and that whatever part is proven false be flung aside. It believes that the Bible is the Book of God, but it is eager for the reasons of the belief to be declared. It believes the doctrine of the creeds, but it asks that each soul be able to say 'credo' for reasons convincing to itself.

Protestant opinion concerning the Bible The Reformation substituted for the infal-The Reformation substituted for the infalibility of an institution and its official representative the infallibility of a small, immutable compact, apprehensible collection of ancient writings, to wit, the Scriptures. Dr. Eliot recognizes that the belief in the literal infallibility of the Bible has been shaken, if not demolished, by the so-called "higher criticism," which, as he says, "is nothing but the application to the Scriptures of methods of research which have been successfully applied to other bodies of ancient historical and literature compactitions." and literary compositions." The influence of the higher criticism, at first felt chiefly by scholars, has gradually percolated through by scholars, has gradually percolated through the masses of the people, until now the state

of the popular mind, chiefly developed during the nineteenth century has prepared the way for the acceptance of new views concerning the Bible and the supernatural in religion. Dr. Eliot points out the inevitable regit of a refusal to admit the infallibility of the Scriptures. "The hugest superstructure ever reared on a diminutive foundation and the most formidable speculation ever based on a minimum of doubtful fact is the Augustinian systematic theology, resting on the literal truth of the story in Genesis about the disobedience of Eve and Adam in the Garden of Eden. The whole superstructure of the generally accepted Protestant systematic theology is foundat on the literal acceptance of the Scriptural account of the fall of Adam and Eve. If this account be not a true history, then the whole logical system built on it, including the doctrines of original and imputed an of the plan of salvation, of grace, mediation and atonement, of blood satisfaction and blood purchase, and of regeneration, falls to the ground." If it be said that, though entire faith in the Bible as an infallible revelation of literal truth be lost, the real faunds, tion of the old dogmas will remain unshaken, because they rest on human nature and experience, Dr. Eliot answers that "civilized society's convictions about human nature and human conduct have undergone profound modifications during the nineteenth century, and are manifestly undergoing still further modifications. Thus, instead o attributing sin in the individual to the innate corruption and perversity of his nature, nodern society attributes it in many instances to physical defects, to bad environment, to unwise or wrongful industrial conditions, to unjust social usages or to the mere weakness of will which cannot resist present indulgences, even when the cost in future suffering stares the victim in the face. With this fundamental reconsideration of the whole doctrine of sin goes grave discussion of the till-now-accepted ideas of justice, punshment and reformation. The theologians used to be sure that they perfectly understood God's justice. The jurists and legislators of to-day are not sure that they understand even what human justice ought to be."
The writer of this cosey shows in the second

place that it is not the authority of the Bible only which has declined during the century just closed; all authority has lost forceauthority political, ecclesiastical, educational and domestic, 'The decline of political or governmental authority since the Reformation is very striking. The present

fear that reverence and love diminish as time goes on T heroism of His life and death